Abstract
Introduction
International human rights law has historically focused on proscribing governmental abuse. States must not torture, detain or kill arbitrarily, discriminate on the basis of race or sex, and so on. 1 Those proscriptions are critical to the human rights regime, but they confront two significant limitations. First, states commit abuses -sometimes, truly monstrous ones -even though they are obligated not to. Second, states are not the only abusers. Proscriptions targeting governmental abuse do not cover the many abuses committed by, for example, private individuals, corporations, armed gangs, and intergovernmental organizations.
Human rights law increasingly addresses those limitations by assigning states obligations to protect. Obligations to protect require states to restrain third parties from committing abuse. The third party in this scenario may be another state, or it may be some other kind of actor. The critical point is that the duty-holding state need not participate in the abuse in order to have an obligation to protect.
Obligations to protect are not new to international law or particular to human rights law.
2 But they are now claimed, prescribed, and applied in varied human rights contexts:
· Even before the development of modern human rights law, the law on the protection of aliens required states to protect foreign nationals from physical injury caused by private actors. 3 Though that obligation was not understood in terms of the aliens' rights, it required states to protect aliens from third-party harm. 4 · Several human rights and criminal law treaties obligate states to protect persons from abuses committed by private actors. 5 States acknowledge that they have such obligations, 6 and treaty bodies apply and enforce them.
· The International Law Commission has proposed making states responsible in some circumstances where they delegate authority to an intergovernmental organization that then violates rights. 13 Under that proposal a delegating state would be responsible even where the abuse was attributable only to the organization.
Though the practice on the obligation to protect is extensive, 14 it also is disjointed. International actors prescribe and apply the obligation, 15 and legal scholars examine it, piecemeal and in discrete contexts. For example, Nicola Jägers has assessed the obligation to protect people from abuses committed by corporations. 16 Andrew Clapham and Alastair Mowbray have analysed the obligation under each article of the European Convention on Human Rights. 17 Rebecca Cook has considered the obligation to protect women. 18 And Gareth Evans and Alex Bellamy have examined the obligation to protect against mass atrocities.
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That piecemeal approach helps define the obligation in select, discrete contexts. But it inadequately guides decisions in all of the multifarious scenarios involving a bystander state. No generalized framework exists for appraising when a state must protect against third-party harm or what that obligation requires. 20 Decision-makers Evans, supra note 12; Bellamy, supra note 12.
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No single framework exists even in the context in which the law is most developed-where the abuser is a private actor. In this context, decision-makers often but do not always invoke the framework articulated in Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. HR (ser. C) No. 4 (1988) , at para. 172, under which states must exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate, and punish any private conduct that intrudes on human rights. Contrast, e.g., ICCPR General Comment 31, supra note 8, at para. 8 (adopting that framework) with, e.g., App answer those questions ad hoc, often overlooking relevant precedents or failing to consider all of the interests at stake. Not surprisingly, their practice is at times misguided, 21 inconsistent, 22 or conceptually confused. 23 This article addresses that problem by presenting a generalized framework on state bystander responsibility -on when states are responsible for failing to protect people from third-party harm. 24 The framework is interpretive in that it explains most of the existing practice. Surveying the practice across different contexts and legal sources (both treaty and customary), the framework extracts the common principles that animate obligations to protect and articulates how those principles apply in concrete cases. Because the practice is disjointed, however, the framework is not purely interpretive. It also constructs a vision of where the practice should go. In short, the framework seeks to nudge the practice in a particular direction, as indicated by the dominant trends. 25 The goal of this article is to help decision-makers (e.g., states, courts, treaty bodies, UN organs, and NGOs) assess whether, in any particular case, a bystander state is and should be responsible.
Some readers may be sceptical of this project. They may argue that obligations to protect are not amenable to any generalized framework because such obligations necessarily depend on the specific source of law. 26 The objection assumes either that the sources are static and have already been established, or that different sources prescribe wholly incomparable obligations. Neither assumption holds. Decision-makers continuously prescribe the obligation in new legal sources or by reinterpreting existing ones. This framework is intended to guide those prescriptive and interpretive decisions. To be effective, the framework must account for existing expectations, but it need not assume that those expectations are static. Many sources are now understood ) 605. Yet those domestic analogues are not entirely on point. A domestic system may circumscribe its constitutional protections, so as to require state action, but then establish horizontal protections in other legal sources (e.g., tort). From an international perspective, it does not matter whether the protections are constitutionally mandated, or established legislatively or judicially. On domestic duties to rescue, see infra note 86. 21 See, e.g., infra notes 113-117, 127-130, 257-261, and accompanying texts. 22 See infra, sect. 3.B. 23 See infra, sect. 3.C. 24 Of course, not every state that fails to satisfy an obligation to protect will be held responsible for its omission. Like other human rights obligations, obligations to protect are erratically and sometimes ineffectively enforced. Nevertheless, they are enforced with sufficient frequency (at least in some contexts) to sustain expectations that they are legally operative -i.e., that they sometimes govern behaviour and are not entirely aspirational. This article identifies when obligations to protect are and should be legally operative. 25 The framework is, roughly, an exercise in constructive interpretation: see R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986), at 52. to establish the obligation, even though they once were not. 27 Further, as this article demonstrates, common principles inform the obligation across contexts. Identifying those principles does not deny that the obligation applies differently depending on the specific circumstances of each case. Rather, it guides decision-makers in light of that variation, by focussing them on the considerations that underlie state bystander responsibility, regardless of context.
Obligations to Protect A As State Obligations
Human rights law typically identifies rights separately from prescribing what states must do to help realize rights. The foundational instrument of the modern regime -the Universal Declaration of Human Rights -recognizes that ' [e]veryone has the right[s] to life, liberty and security of person', and to adequate 'food, clothing, housing and medical care'. 28 The Declaration was not intended to bind states so did not prescribe state obligations. Yet it did shape expectations on the content of universal rights. The rights as formulated in the Declaration now appear in the two principal human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 29 The ICCPR and ICESCR are intended to bind states and do prescribe state obligations. But they define those obligations separately from the recognized rights and with language that is, for one reason or another, ambiguous.
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In his influential book, Basic Rights, Henry Shue argued for further specifying the obligations associated with human rights. 31 obligations. And he identified three: obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil. 32 Obligations to respect are paradigmatic obligations not to violate rights. Obligations to protect require states to restrain third parties from violating rights. Both of those obligations preserve negative freedoms -freedoms from abuse. They differ, however, in that obligations to protect are assigned to actors that do not necessarily participate in the abuse. Finally, obligations to fulfil require states to foster positive liberties. Unlike obligations to respect and protect, obligations to fulfil assume no particular abuser.
Shue's typology helped inform what states must do under the human rights treaties. Consider, for example, the ICCPR right to life. 33 That right unquestionably grounds an obligation not to kill people arbitrarily (obligation to respect). Shue demonstrated that, based on the same right, states might have to restrain third parties from killing (obligation to protect). They might even have to provide people with access to emergency medical care (obligation to fulfil). 34 Similarly, the ICESCR right to food had been understood to require states to try to make food more widely available (obligation to fulfil).
35 Under Shue's approach, states might have to refrain from forcibly depriving persons of food (obligation to respect), and to prevent third parties from doing the same (obligation to protect). To be sure, Shue's obligations could easily be phrased as new rights: the obligation to respect the right to food might be rephrased as the right not to be forcibly deprived of food by the state. But the right to food had already been conceptualized and codified in more general terms. Shue was influential because he presented a vision for developing human rights law consistently with its own conceptual and textual foundations.
B As Compared with the Alternatives
The idea that states have obligations to protect is not novel or radical. Political theorists have long cited such obligations to justify the state's very existence: states exist, at least in part, to protect their populations from harm and to enforce the law against those who may intrude on individual liberties. 36 In international law, obligations to 32 Ibid. Shue refers to these obligations as obligations to avoid, protect, and aid. The respect, protect, and fulfill language is conceptually the same and now dominates the human rights literature. responsible. Under the rules on state responsibility, conduct generally is attributable to a state when committed by state agents. 43 The rules identify who is a state agent. Some have argued that those rules should be interpreted more expansively, so that a broader range of actors affiliated with the state are state agents. 44 That approach overlaps with the obligation to protect because it, too, requires states to enforce human rights norms against actors that traditionally have not been considered state agents. But the attribution approach targets a narrower range of abusers. Some abusers will not be sufficiently connected to any state for their conduct to be attributable to a state. A state must address their conduct, if at all, because the state has an obligation to protect.
The Disjointed Practice

A Splintering
Even the cursory review in this article's Introduction demonstrates that obligations to protect have become prevalent in human rights law. But the practice is heavily splintered. Decision-makers do not conceptualize the obligation in general terms. Instead, they tend to disaggregate the obligation based on varied but overlapping criteria.
Sometimes, they define the obligation by reference to a specific source of law.
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They specify the obligation under one treaty or customary rule, without assessing analogous obligations in other legal sources. Other times, decision-makers define the obligation in terms of the kind of actor committing the abuse. See, e.g., Genocide Case, supra note 10, at para. 429 ('The content of the duty to prevent varies from one instrument to another, according to the wording of the relevant provisions, and depending on the nature of the acts to be prevented'). The design of the human rights treaty system encourages this source-specific approach. Each of the 9 core universal treaties and 3 regional ones has a body charged with interpreting only its foundational text. Distinct texts contain similar obligations, but the obligations are often formulated slightly differently and have varying scopes of application: See, e.g., the sources cited at supra note 8 (varied obligations of non-refoulement). 46 See the sources cited at infra note 68. 48 Still other times, decision-makers define the obligation based on the specific act of abuse. 49 The obligation to address mass atrocities is understood to be wholly distinct from the obligation to address more routine acts of violence. 50 Finally, decision-makers sometimes define the obligation based on the identity of the rights holder. 51 The obligation depends on whom the abuse victimizes. None of those criteria alone determines whether a state has the obligation.
52 So decision-makers who define it by reference to only one or the other inevitably are misinformed. When assessing state bystander responsibility, they fail to consider relevant precedents or all of the interests at stake.
B Inconsistency
The practice on the obligation to protect is also inconsistent. Indeed, inconsistencies persist even in the context in which the law is most developed -where the abuser is a private actor. Here is one important example: the human rights treaty bodies regularly assert that states must protect against any private conduct that intrudes on human rights. 53 Substantial other practice disagrees. First, states have not prescribed the obligation uniformly for all private conduct that intrudes on human rights. Rather, they have prescribed it unevenly, displaying differing levels of commitment depending on the specific context. 54 Some treaties expressly establish the obligation and define it precisely. Most criminal law treaties fall in that camp. States must protect against the proscribed misconduct by extraditing or criminally investigating suspected offenders. 55 56 Because such treaties do not define what measures are appropriate, they accord a state some discretion to select its own measures, and they limit the extent to which compliance may meaningfully be assessed. Still other treaties are ambiguous on whether they even establish the obligation. The ICCPR requires states to 'ensure' all of the specified rights. 57 That language has been interpreted to establish obligations to protect. 58 But the language is ambiguous 59 and probably was not drafted with such obligations in mind. 60 Further, even if the ICCPR establishes obligations to protect, it does not define those obligations. The ICESCR confronts similar problems. 61 The ambiguity in the ICCPR and ICESCR is significant because those treaties set out a broad range of rights that everyone is understood to have. Treaties with clearer, more defined commitments limit the obligation to specific rights or rights holders. 65 That tendency has been particularly pronounced for obligations to protect women. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) requires states to protect women from private acts of discrimination. 66 Many states parties have indicated that, as applied to them, the obligation is at best marginally operative. 67 Third, the treaty bodies do not apply the obligation consistently with their own expansive claims. Treaty bodies commonly claim that the obligation attaches to every right on which private actors might intrude. 68 But that claim appears in contexts in which it has little practical effect. For instance, treaty bodies advance that claim in interpretive comments that are not binding on states and do not apply the obligation to particular facts. 69 Likewise, treaty bodies make that claim as dicta in decisions that are more narrowly tailored. 70 In fact, treaty bodies apply the obligation almost exclusively to a particular subset of abuses. Section 4.B.1 of this article describes that practice in more detail. The point here is that the treaty bodies' expansive claims are inconsistent with substantial other practice, including the practice of the treaty bodies themselves. 
C Conceptual Confusion
The practice on the obligation to protect is disjointed for yet another reason: some of it confuses the obligation to protect with the attribution of the underlying abuse. Obligations to protect do not require that any abuse be attributable to the duty-holding state. They, by definition, require states to protect against abuses committed by third parties. The concepts become conflated, however, because decision-makers invoke principles of attribution to justify outcomes on the obligation to protect.
The problem of conflation is longstanding. Early decisions on the protection of aliens justified state bystander responsibility on the ground that bystander states somehow enable abuse. 71 The decisions suggest that a state that does nothing becomes complicit in the third-party abuse. The same logic appears in Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, the watershed decision that interpreted the obligation into ambiguous treaty text.
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In Velásquez Rodríguez, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights determined that Honduran officials actually participated in the disappearance at issue.
73 But even if they had not, Honduras failed to satisfy an obligation to protect. The court reasoned, 'Where the acts of private parties that violate [rights] are not seriously investigated, those parties are aided in a sense by the government, thereby making the State responsible on the international plane.' 74 The suggestion, again, is that a state enables abuses that it does not take seriously.
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More recent decisions also conflate the two concepts. In Cyprus v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights held Turkey responsible as a result of abuses committed by the Turkish Cypriot administration (the TRNC) in northern Cyprus. 76 Turkey may have participated in the TRNC's abuses. 77 But the court seemed to acknowledge that the abuses were not demonstrably attributable to Turkey under the traditional rules on attribution. 78 The court then vacillated incoherently between suggesting: (1) that attribution was nevertheless appropriate; 79 and (2) that Turkey had failed to satisfy an obligation to protect. 80 The decision is unclear on why Turkey is responsible. 
72
Velásquez Rodríguez, supra note 20.
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Ibid., at para. 182.
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Ibid., at para. 177. 75 See ibid., at para. 176-177. Ibid., at paras 25-26 and 130. 78 Ibid., at para. 76 ('It is not necessary to determine whether . . . Turkey actually exercised detailed control over the policies and actions of the authorities of the TRNC') (internal quotation marks omitted). 79 See ibid. (asserting that Turkey's territorial control in northern Cyprus 'entails her responsibility for the policies and actions of the TRNC') (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted); ibid., at para. 77 ('[Turkey's] responsibility cannot be confined to the acts of its own soldiers and officials. . .but must also be engaged by virtue of the acts of the local administration'); ibid. (indicating that the TRNC's violations 'are imputable to Turkey'). 80 See ibid., at paras 76-77 (using language indicative of an obligation to protect when asserting that Turkey had to 'secure' rights in the region). Decisions like Velásquez Rodríguez and Cyprus collapse the analytic distinction between attribution and the obligation to protect. In each case, the obligation to protect captured state involvement short of the participation necessary for attribution.
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The line between attributing abuses to the state (i.e., finding that it violated an obligation to respect) and making it responsible as a bystander (i.e., finding that it violated an obligation to protect) is sometimes fuzzy. But obligations to respect and protect are two separate human rights obligations, and the distinction remains important.
First, because obligations to respect are better understood, conflation risks sidelining obligations to protect. In Behrami v. France, the claimants argued that French troops had failed to protect two children from unexploded ordnance in post-conflict Kosovo. 83 The European Court of Human Rights re-characterized the claim as one on attribution. It determined that, because a UN organ had the mandate to demine in Kosovo, any failure to demine was attributable only to the UN. 84 Of course, France also failed to demine. If France had an obligation to protect, it might be responsible for that failure. But by framing the question in attribution terms, the court failed even to consider the obligation-to-protect.
Second, conflation wrongly suggests that state bystander responsibility is appropriate only where the state is somehow complicit in the abuse. As section 4.A.3 explains, conduct akin to complicity (but short of the participation necessary for attribution) is occasionally relevant to appraising state bystander responsibility. More often than not, however, a bystander state is responsible even if its conduct cannot reasonably be construed as complicity. The bystander state is responsible because it failed to satisfy an affirmative obligation to protect.
Third, conflation confuses what states must do to satisfy their human rights obligations. Because states have obligations to respect, a state is responsible whenever conduct attributable to it violates rights. The state must actually prevent the violation or accept responsibility. Obligations to protect are less onerous: a state must try to protect persons from abuse, but it need not guarantee that persons will be protected. 85 In other words, a state is not responsible every time a third party violates rights. It is responsible only if it does not try hard enough to protect against the third-party harm.
A Framework for Decision
The disjointed practice is symptomatic of a deeper problem. No generalized framework exists for assessing whether, in any particular case, a bystander state is or should be responsible. This section helps fill that void. It argues that the same basic principles animate state bystander responsibility across contexts: whether a state must protect someone from third-party harm depends on the state's relationship with the third party 82 See Velásquez Rodríguez, supra note 20, at para. 182; Cyprus, supra note 76, at paras 25-26 and 130. and on the kind of harm caused. A duty-holding state must take reasonable measures to restrain the abusive third party. Those principles -familiar from some domestic rules on third-party liability 86 -are fairly straightforward when expressed at a high level of abstraction. They immediately raise important follow-up questions: which relationships and harms trigger the obligation? And how does one assess whether the state's measures are reasonable? Thus, in addition to identifying the basic principles, this section begins to answer those follow-up questions. It establishes benchmarks for applying the principles in concrete cases.
A Relationship with the Abuser
The interest in protecting people from harm motivates human rights law but does not (by itself) define obligations to protect. First, that interest does not identify which state must act in any particular case. Unless all states must protect against all third-party harms, something more is needed -some additional nexus -to justify assigning the obligation to a particular state. Second, the interest in restraining abusive third parties is inevitably in tension with desired limits on the state's restraints. Obligations to protect must manage that tension. They require a normative judgement that, given a state's particular relationship with the abuser, 87 the state's restraints are desirable and not overly intrusive. Journal Officiel 14876 (the duty depends on the duty-holder's capacity). Though noteworthy, the similarities between those domestic duties and the obligation to protect should not be overstated. Domestic duties apply to private actors, and the reasons for limiting them (e.g., the preservation of individual autonomy) may not translate easily to states. The domestic duties also differ from the obligation to protect in their specific applications. 87 Some readers may wonder whether the relevant relationship for appraising state bystander responsibility is instead the state's relationship with the victim. (After all, the state's relationship with the victim is relevant to determining whether the state may pursue a claim for her injury: see International Law Commission, Report of the International Commission: Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries, UN Doc A/61/10 (2006), Arts 3 and 8.) For instance, these readers may cite the state's relationship with its population to explain why the obligation applies in the state's territory: see infra, sect. 4.A.2. The state's relationship with the victim lacks the explanatory force of its relationship with the abuser. Even in a state's own territory, the obligation varies depending on whether the abuser is a private individual, another state, or some other kind of actor: ibid. That result cannot be explained by the state's relationship with the victim -which for each kind of abuser is the same. That said, the state's relationship with the victim helps explain one subset of obligations to protect: the obligation of non-refoulement and its analogues. See infra note 158-159 and accompanying text. Conceptualizing the obligation in terms of the state's relationship with the abuser extends to this context the logic that underlies the rules on attribution. Conduct generally is attributable to a state when committed by the state's actual or de facto agents. 88 International lawyers disagree on precisely who is a state agent for attribution purposes. 89 They agree, however, that a state must have substantial control over a person for him or her to be its agent. 90 Control usually indicates that a state has the capacity to prevent the agent from acting badly. But control in the agency context is not exclusively or even primarily about the state's capacity to control its agents. 91 Rather, it reflects a normative judgement about the nature of the agency relationship: a state acts through its agents so should control them in order to ensure that they act properly on its behalf. 92 Indeed, a state's control over its agents is so desirable that the state is strictly responsible for their misconduct. The state is responsible regardless of whether, on the facts, it had the capacity to control a particular, misbehaving agent.
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A state need not control third parties (i.e., non-agents), but it may have to exercise lesser degrees of influence. Specifically, the state may have to influence third parties not to violate rights. Here again, the legal rule is not about whether a state has the capacity to restrain the abuser. 94 The 95 Analogous considerations appear elsewhere in international law. For instance, international legal norms discourage states from unilaterally influencing intergovernmental organizations, except through the IOs' ordinary decision-making processes. 96 Those norms circumscribe when and how states should restrain abusive IOs. To be clear, the fact that the abuser is an IO -its 'type' -is relevant but not determinative to defining its relationship with the state. States have different kinds of relationships with abusers of the same type.
The question, then, is whether (on balance) the considerations that inform the kind of relationship at issue favour requiring the state to restrain the third party. That inquiry will sometimes be difficult or indeterminate. But for many common relationships in the international legal order, the practice offers substantial guidance.
Delegates
States regularly delegate to third parties governmental functions. 97 Some delegates are considered state agents such that their misconduct is attributable to the state. According to the draft articles on state responsibility adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC), the conduct of a non-state actor is attributable to a state when the actor exercises authority 'normally exercised by State organs'. 98 The ILC does not identify which authorities are sufficiently governmental for the delegate's conduct to be attributable to the state. Most of the ILC's examples involve a delegate's exercise of police power. 99 The ILC is ambiguous on when the conduct of a delegate that performs 101 In this scenario, the second state essentially delegates governmental functions to organs of the first. The ILC commentaries suggest that a similar logic applies when the delegate is instead the organ of an IO.
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Attribution is appropriate, however, only when the delegated organ acts on behalf and under the exclusive control of the delegating state. 103 Here again, a delegate's conduct is sometimes not attributable to the delegating state.
Where attribution is inappropriate, the state should have a fairly robust obligation to protect. In this scenario, the state need not control the delegate. But because the delegate performs public functions under a governmental grant of authority, the state should influence it not to violate rights. Human rights treaty bodies consistently find that states have that obligation when the delegate is a private actor. 104 For instance, in B.d.B. v. Netherlands, the Netherlands authorized a private insurance board to administer a social security scheme. 105 The ICCPR committee determined that the Netherlands had an obligation to protect. The committee explained that a state is 'not relieved of its obligations' -in that case, the obligation to ensure equal protection of the laws -'when some of its functions are delegated to other autonomous organs'.
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The same intuition animates some of the practice on delegations to intergovernmental organizations. The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly indicated that states that transfer governmental authority to an IO must ensure that the IO respects human rights. 107 Primarily on the basis of that jurisprudence, the ILC is proposing a 100 The ILC commentaries suggest answering that question by reference to each state's particular 'history and traditions', considering, e.g., the content of the delegated powers, the purpose for which they are delegated, and the extent to which the delegate is accountable to the state: ibid., at 43. 101 Ibid., at Art. 6. 102 Ibid., at 44. 103 The Behrami court thus retreated from its earlier dicta. It suggested that a state is not responsible -even as a bystander -where abuses are attributable only to the IO.
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Focusing on the state's relationship with the abuser would enable decision-makers to defend their intuitions on delegation while protecting the interests relating to IOs. A state has a different relationship with its IO-delegate than it has with an IO in which it merely participates. The IO-delegate exercises governmental authority on behalf of the state. The state should restrain that IO, regardless of whether the state has circumvented its own obligations or contributed to the abuse. The same does not necessarily follow when the state merely participates in an IO, a scenario to which this article returns in section 4.A.3.
States may regulate all delegates at the time of delegation. For example, in Matthews, the United Kingdom should have protected Gibraltarians when negotiating the Treaty of the European Community. Once the delegation occurs, however, the state has fewer acceptable options for influencing an IO than a private delegate. When the delegate is an IO, the state usually should coordinate with other states to alter the delegation or otherwise oversee the IO. 118 The state need not be similarly restrained when the delegate is a private actor, so the obligation should be stronger.
Territorial Subjects
A state should also restrain third parties in its territory that are not delegates. The paradigmatic obligation-to-protect scenario involves private abuses in the state's territory. Long before the development of modern human rights law, a state had to protect foreign nationals in its territory from private harm.
119 Today, human rights and criminal law treaties extend that obligation to a broader range of persons and rights. 120 Under some interpretations, a state must protect against any private conduct in its territory that intrudes on someone's rights.
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The dominant explanation for why a state must restrain abusers in its territory is textual. Many human rights treaties bind the state only in its own territory and/or 117 Abuses committed during an IO operation are attributable to whichever entity (the IO 122 If those treaties establish obligations to protect, then (the reasoning goes) the obligations are essentially territorial. That account is insufficient to explain the practice. First, it does not explain why human rights treaties codify territorial or jurisdictional limitations in the first place. Second, it does not explain when states have jurisdiction -and therefore obligations to protect -outside their national territories. 123 And third, that textual account fails to explain why obligations to protect are understood to be primarily territorial, 124 even when the treaties establishing them contain no territorial or jurisdictional limitation.
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This framework better explains why a state must restrain abusers in its territory. Statehood defines the relevant relationships in an area and entails the obligation to satisfy certain minimum standards, including with respect to human rights. Simply put, a state must keep its house in order -in Max Huber's words, 'display therein the activities of a State'.
126 At the same time, a state's relationship with its territorial subjects is more attenuated than its relationship with delegates, and the obligation should therefore be weaker. Return to the example of a person planning a killing spree. The state's authority over the suspect is properly limited in order to protect him from undue state intrusion. That potentially intrusive oversight is less troubling when the abuser is a delegate, because delegates themselves exercise governmental authority. Moreover, delegates assent to and benefit from the delegation relationship so are better positioned than mere territorial subjects to protect themselves.
The above analysis focuses on the obligation to restrain private abusers in the state's territory. States also host in their territories other states and intergovernmental organizations. The practice on whether states must restrain those actors from violating rights is relatively sparse. In one notable opinion, the committed during the CIA's rendition and detention programme. 127 The commission concluded that every European state had to protect against CIA abuses in its airspace or territory. The commission supported that conclusion by citing the well-established rule that a state must protect against private abuses in its territory. The commission then reasoned, 'This is even more true in respect of agents of foreign states.'
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That reasoning is only partially correct. The commission rightly determined that a state must restrain third parties in its territory, including when the third party is another state. But international law encourages territorial states to exercise less, not more, authority over other states than over private actors. Various legal norms limit when and how a state influences other states in its territory. 129 Such norms are intended to foster cooperation and friendly relations among states, and to preserve their legal equality. The Venice Commission implicitly accommodated those norms. It did not direct European states to invoke their expansive domestic authorities against the United States, as it almost certainly would have done if the United States were a private actor. Instead, the commission directed European states to try to restrain the CIA while also managing other treaty commitments and the rules on immunity. 130 Here again, the abuser's type affects the scope of the obligation. The obligation is weaker when the territorial subject is another state than when it is a private actor.
External Actors
Because obligations to protect are incidental to statehood, they apply primarily within the state. Absent some reason for extending the obligation extraterritorially, a state need not restrain third parties in other states. 131 Some scholars have argued for making that claim operational by assigning or differentiating the obligation based on each state's capacity to avert the harm. 140 The argument has some doctrinal support in the Genocide Case, in which the International Court of Justice examined Serbia's responsibility resulting from genocidal acts committed by a group of Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia. 141 The court determined that the genocidal conduct was not attributable to Serbia but that Serbia failed to satisfy an obligation to protect.
142 That obligation -found in the Genocide Conventionpresumably bound all state parties. Yet the court determined that the obligation varied depending on each state's influence over the abusers:
Various parameters operate when assessing whether a State has duly discharged the obligation concerned. The first, which varies greatly from one State to another, is clearly the capacity to influence effectively the action of persons likely to commit, or already committing genocide.
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The passage focuses on the state's 'capacity to influence' the abusers.
Yet something else is clearly animating the court's decision. Serbia was not a disconnected bystander with only the capacity to influence the Bosnian Serbs. Serbia supported the Bosnian Serbs politically and militarily, and helped oversee and direct them. 144 That relationship is relevant, according to the above passage, because it means that Serbia was especially capable of restraining the Bosnian Serbs. More than that, the relationship indicates that Serbia should have restrained the Bosnian Serbs. Indeed, the court itself assessed capacity in part through that normative lens. It explained that a state's capacity must 'be assessed by legal criteria' that limit whether the state may act in a particular situation and that define the state's 'legal position vis-à-vis the situations and persons facing the danger'.
145 Such legal criteria are irrelevant to the state's capacity to restrain the abuser. They are relevant because they reflect normative judgements about whether the state should restrain the abuser. In the event, Serbia's support for the Bosnian Serbs put them in a position to violate rights. Having substantially enabled that conduct, Serbia could not lawfully stand by, even though other states with the capacity to restrain the Bosnian Serbs probably could.
To be clear, the court held Serbia responsible without finding that Serbia participated or was complicit in genocide. 146 The court's standard for complicity is consistent with the more general rules on aiding and assisting responsibility. According to the draft 140 147 The standard requires something between knowledge and purpose with respect to the particular abuse at issue. 148 A state that gives the abuser general support not directed at any particular misconduct is not responsible for assisting in the misconduct. But that state may have an obligation to protect. Even though Serbia did not assist in the particular acts of genocide at Srebrenica, it unequivocally acted badly. Its causal connection to the abuse provides the normative justification for assigning it an obligation to protect. 149 Other practice confirms that a state may have an obligation to protect where the state substantially enables an external actor to violate rights. In 2008, Georgia claimed that Russia's conduct in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (two breakaway Georgian regions) violated the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). 150 According to Georgia, Russia provided 'unprecedented and far-reaching support' to Georgian separatist groups that acted discriminatorily. 151 The International Court of Justice has not yet decided the case on the merits so has not assessed whether the separatists' allegedly discriminatory conduct is attributable to Russia. Even if it is not, Russia may have an obligation to protect. 152 In an order on provisional measures, the court directed Georgia and Russia to 'do all in their power to ensure that public authorities and public institutions under their control or influence do not engage in acts of racial discrimination'. 153 The influence language hints at an obligation to protect: assuming that Russia did not control but substantially supported the separatists, Russia should have influenced them not to violate rights.
Analogous 151 Ibid., at para. 13; see also ibid., at paras 7-18. 152 Ibid., at paras 144 and 149(4). 153 Ibid., at para. 149(4) (emphasis added). 154 Cyprus, supra note 76, at paras 76-77. 155 A similar logic may explain non-refoulement and its varied analogues (e.g., in situations involving extraditions and extraterritorial captures). A state that transfers someone to another state, despite the risk of abuse, usually does not transfer the person 'with a view to facilitating' that abuse. Absent some indication to the contrary, the state's involvement does not rise to the level necessary for assisting responsibility. Rather, the state is respons ible because it fails to satisfy an obligation to protect. By transferring the person, the duty-holding state substantially enables an external actor to violate rights. 157 Like in other contexts, that enabling relationship seems to trigger the obligation to protect. Having said that, the state's relationship with the abuser admittedly has less explanatory force in this than in other contexts. A transferring state has no particular relationship with the abuser, other than the enabling relationship created by the transfer. Moreover, the practice indicates that non-refoulement and its analogues also depend on the state's relationship with the victim.
158 So this set of obligations to protect is, to some extent, sui generis.
159
A state's relationship with the abuser offers only a partial account of when and why the state must protect against third-party harm. In sum, the general rule that a state need not influence external actors is subject to an important exception: a state may have to restrain external actors if it substantially 156 On the lack of clarity in Cyprus, see supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text. The Ilaşcu court is similarly unclear. On the one hand, the court suggests that Russia was responsible for the abuses as such: 'there [was] a continuous and uninterrupted link of responsibility on the part of the Russian Federation': supra note 123, at para. 392. On the other hand, the court described the obligation as an obligation of conduct -one requiring some 'attempt to put an end to the applicants' situation': ibid. enables them to violate rights. The degree of support necessary to trigger the obligation is somewhat uncertain. The practice indicates that the enabling state's support must be considerable -something more than mere financial aid but less than the knowing or purposeful participation necessary for attribution. 160 That contribution justifies assigning the state an obligation to protect. After all, a state that substantially supports an external actor has already involved itself in another state's affairs. The normative considerations that usually discourage states from restraining external actors -the interests in non-interference and fostering friendly relations among states -either are less pronounced or have already been compromised. They become outweighed by the interest in protecting human lives. Moreover, the enabling state's contribution warrants assigning the obligation to that state, even though not to all others.
B Severity of Harm
The obligation to protect also depends on the kind of harm caused. 161 States must protect only against conduct that: (1) causes serious physical or psychological harm; or (2) affects people because they belong to a vulnerable group. 162 Conduct in that first category typically intrudes on the victim's physical security: torture, rape, slavery, extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, and other cruel or inhuman treatment all trigger obligations to protect. Occasionally, conduct causes sufficiently serious psychological harm without intruding on a person's physical space. In EM v. Secretary of State, the House of Lords examined the planned deportation of a mother and child where the home country would strip the mother of custody. 163 The claimants asserted that the loss of custody would violate the right to 'private and family life' under the European Convention on Human Rights. 164 The Lords underscored that not all invasions of privacy, or even all decisions stripping a parent of custody, cause sufficient harm to trigger the obligation. 165 But the loss of custody would cause especially egregious harm 160 None of the practice supports the proposition that the mere provision of financial aid is sufficient to trigger the obligation. A rule that requires more substantial assistance makes sense: international law should encourage states to help one another without the risk of assuming additional obligations. The normative balance shifts, however, where a state's assistance is both substantial and causally connected to the recipient's abuse. 161 Human rights law typically assesses severity both in kind and in scale. in EM, because the mother had cared for the child since birth, and the child knew no family in the home country. The United Kingdom had an obligation to protect.
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The second category consists of conduct that discriminates against or otherwise affects people by virtue of their membership of a vulnerable group. Such conduct causes severe harm because it reinforces existing inequalities and undermines the victims' capacity to participate fully in public life. For instance, in the Yanomami case, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights examined private conduct that affected the health and cultural integrity of a nearby indigenous community. 167 Because indigenous, the Yanomami were especially susceptible to the harmful consequences of that conduct. Brazil had an obligation to protect.
Limiting the obligation to those two categories of conduct resolves some apparent inconsistencies in the practice. 168 Recall the claim that states must protect against all harms, no matter how severe. 169 That claim does not reflect the practice as applied. Treaties that expressly establish the obligation do so almost exclusively for conduct falling in the above two categories. 170 Criminal law treaties require states to protect people from specific conduct that causes serious physical harm (e.g., acts of terrorism 171 The post-ratification practice follows that same basic pattern. States regularly address, in their periodic reports under the universal human rights treaties, the measures they take to satisfy obligations to protect. Those measures almost always target conduct falling in the above categories. 181 Treaty bodies focus on the same conduct. They overwhelmingly apply the obligation to conduct that causes serious physical harm or discriminates against members of vulnerable groups.
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To be sure, decision-makers occasionally apply the obligation more broadly. 183 In Von Hannover v. Germany, the European Court of Human Rights determined that constant attention by the paparazzi press triggered the obligation to protect. 184 The court implicitly acknowledged that the conduct, though intrusive, was not especially severe.
185 It nevertheless held Germany responsible. Similarly, in its observations on Japan, the ICESCR committee expressed concern that Japan inadequately protected workers from excessive work hours. 186 The committee did not assess the severity of that harm, whether in general terms or on the facts of any particular case. But long working hours are unlikely to have been sufficiently severe, across the board, to fall in the above two categories. 187 In the practice, cases like Von Hannover and the observations on Japan are outliers.
Some readers may seize on such cases to argue that the obligation applies more broadly. 188 These readers likely are concerned because limiting the obligation to particular 181 See, e.g., Honduras ICCPR Report, supra note 6, at paras 45-53; Tajikistan CEDAW Report, supra note 6, at 7-8. harms exposes a potential lacuna in the human rights regime: certain conduct may intrude on rights but not trigger any obligation to protect. As a practical matter, that limitation is most relevant for economic, social, and cultural rights. Although some conduct that intrudes on those rights triggers the obligation, 189 much such conduct does not. Human rights law partly addresses that lacuna with obligations to fulfil. Obligations to fulfil require states to enable rights holders, instead of restraining abusers. To understand how the two obligations intersect, consider the right to work. A company that dismisses an employee interferes with his right to work, but absent some serious harm or evidence of discrimination, the dismissal does not trigger any obligation to protect. 190 The state need not restrain the company from dismissing the employee. Nevertheless, the state may have to fulfil the employee's right to work -for example, by offering educational programmes or trying to target the causes of unemployment. Because obligations to protect and fulfil are complementary, obligations to fulfil may render obligations to protect less compelling. 191 Protecting people from workplace dismissal is less critical if they may transfer easily to new jobs.
This article leaves open whether obligations to protect should apply more broadly. 192 The answer depends partly on the content of state obligations to fulfil. Those obligations are still rather underdeveloped. 193 The answer also depends on the weight of any competing considerations. 194 The desire to protect people from thirdparty harm must be balanced against the interests in allocating finite resources consistently with social priorities; 195 encouraging rights holders to protect themselves; 196 and defining universal obligations for states with vastly different economic, cultural, and political traditions. 197 Currently, only conduct falling in the above two categories triggers the obligation to protect. Efforts to extend the obligation to other conduct should account for obligations to fulfil and for the relevant competing considerations.
C Reasonable Measures
The state's relationship with the abuser and the severity of the harm together determine whether a state has the obligation to protect. Once a state has that obligation, the question becomes: what must the state do? The defining feature of the obligation to protect is that it requires states to restrain third parties from committing abuse. States have myriad measures for restraining third parties. 198 Such measures differ in kind (e.g., criminal or diplomatic sanction); in their intended immediate effect (e.g., to avert an imminent harm or establish a general deterrent); and in their intended target (e.g., a particular abuser or a diffuse group of potential abusers). In any particular scenario, however, only some measures will be both available to the state and sufficient to satisfy its obligation to protect. The state must take reasonable measures to restrain the abuser.
That formulation makes clear that the obligation is an obligation of conduct.
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A state must try to restrain abusers -it must take reasonable measures toward that end -but it need not guarantee that abusers will be restrained. The practice confirms as much. 200 Treaties establishing obligations to protect uniformly require states to take measures, not to achieve particular outcomes. 201 The same holds for due diligence standards, which dominate the practice on private abuses 202 and the ICJ invoked in the Genocide Case. 203 States must exercise whatever diligence is due without guaranteeing the end result. 204 Defining the obligation as an obligation of conduct is consistent with its conceptual underpinnings. States are discouraged from exercising complete control over third parties 205 so should not be strictly responsible for third-party abuses. 206 The reasonableness standard is context-specific, 207 but several factors inform whether particular measures are reasonable. First, the reasonableness inquiry depends on the degree of discretion accorded to states in any particular context. Some practice grants states considerable discretion to select their own measures. 208 Treaties that establish obligations to protect often require states to take appropriate measures, without defining which measures are appropriate. 209 Similarly, due diligence standards require states to exercise whatever diligence is due; they do not define such diligence. According states some discretion makes sense because states are, in the first instance, best situated to assess and respond to particular instances of abuse. Given the range of possible circumstances and measures, international law cannot possibly specify the measures that states must take in every obligation-to-protect scenario. But the obligation would be meaningless if states had complete discretion to define their own conduct. So to varying degrees the practice also constrains state discretion. Several treaties identify specific (usually criminal) measures that states must take. 210 Other treaties are presumed to require such measures. 211 The more expectations coalesce around specific measures, the less discretion states have to select their own -in other words, the less reasonable it is for states not to take the measures expected of them.
Second, whether the state's measures are reasonable depends on the two variables discussed above. The state's relationship with the abuser and the severity of the harm affect not only whether a state has the obligation, but also what that obligation requires. Measures that are reasonable in one kind of relationship or for one kind of harm may well be unreasonable in or for another. Return to the Venice Commission's opinion on CIA abuses in Europe. European states almost certainly would have had to pursue criminal measures against the CIA if it were a private actor. 212 But criminal measures are often inapt or ineffective against organs of another state. 213 The commission correctly determined that European states could reasonably pursue non-criminal measures against the CIA, even if such measures would be unreasonably lax for private abusers. A similar dynamic operates under the severity variable. States generally must pursue criminal measures against private individuals who intentionally cause severe bodily harm; the same is not true for individuals who cause less serious harm. 214 Third, the reasonableness of the state's measures depends on the scope of the problem that they are designed to address. Decision-makers unquestionably consider the scale of abuse when assessing state bystander responsibility, but they usually fail to explain why scale matters. 215 The scale of abuse does not affect whether a state has the obligation.
In some situations, a state must try to avert 216 or redress 217 even a single instance of abuse. Rather, the scale of abuse is evidence that the state is not doing enough to satisfy its obligation. 218 A state that takes more effective measures may lessen the incidents of abuse. The scale of abuse also affects the kinds of measures the state must take. A state that confronts a widespread problem must respond accordingly -with systemic measures designed to reform the legal or behavioural patterns that contribute to abuse. 219 A state likely acts unreasonably if it does not take such measures.
Finally, the reasonableness inquiry may depend on the state's capacity to restrain the abuser. A state is not absolved of its obligation simply because it lacks effective measures of restraint. The whole point of the obligation is to require states to develop those measures. Most of the practice assumes that states can develop such measures. 220 And though states are disparately capable, the practice typically does not differentiate the obligation on that basis. 221 Indeed, some practice appears outright hostile to the idea that the obligation varies depending on each state's capacity to develop effective measures of restraint. 222 Nevertheless, the practice does contain hints of differentiation. For example, decision-makers sometimes relax the obligation when a state's capacity is manifestly impaired. In Ilaşcu, the court examined abuses committed in a semi-autonomous region in Moldova. 223 The court recognized that, because Moldova lacked authority in the area, it could not take the measures ordinarily required of states. 224 Although Moldova had an obligation to protect, its measures might reasonably be different from and less effective than the measures of more capable states. 225 Other practice might also permit differentiation. The European Court of Human Rights has defined the obligation by reference to an undue burden: the obligation 'must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities'. 226 The burden of taking particular measures is necessarily relative and inconstant. As James Nickel explains, 'When we ask whether a certain party can bear a burden, we really want to know whether that party can bear that burden without abandoning other responsibilities that ought not be abandoned.' 227 The answer will vary depending on the state's particular resource and other constraints. Indeed, developing states regularly invoke their capacity constraints to excuse a lacklustre performance on human rights. 228 Thus, differentiation in this context is both subtle and controversial. It should be less so. 229 States are variously capable of restraining third parties and confront disparate challenges to satisfying their obligations to protect. Defining reasonableness in part based on capacity would enjoin all states to make concerted efforts to restrain abusers, without requiring them to do that which they genuinely cannot. 230 Further, differentiation would permit each state to focus on its primary areas of concern -on abuses that are especially deep-seated or prevalent -instead of stretching its (inevitably limited) resources too thin.
The Framework Applied
Having presented and justified that general framework for decision, this section applies it to two current debates in human rights law: when must a state restrain third parties outside its territory? And what must states do to protect women from private acts of violence? The framework helps resolve those debates by identifying the questions and considerations relevant to assessing state bystander responsibility. This section concludes by suggesting how the same framework may inform obligations that are analogous to obligations to protect but arise outside human rights law.
A Extraterritorial Obligations
This article has already identified some scenarios in which a state must restrain abusers outside its territory -namely, where the state has delegated authority to or substantially enabled those abusers. 231 This section amplifies on those points in order to direct one of the most contentious debates in modern human rights law: when do human rights obligations apply extraterritorially? In the legal scholarship, that debate has centered on obligations to respect.
232 Extraterritorial obligations to protect receive little attention in the academic literature but arise repeatedly in practice. 233 In the practice, decision-makers variously assert that the decisive factor for determining whether a state has an extraterritorial obligation to protect is the state's: (1) control 230 Cf. Nickel, supra note 192, at 127 ('the obligations flowing from a right will be without effect if their addressees are genuinely unable to comply with them or unable to comply while meeting their higherranked responsibilities'). 231 The first approach focuses on the state's control over the potential victim: a state must protect from extraterritorial harm persons over whom it has physical control. That approach suggests that states have very limited extraterritorial obligations to protect. States would have such obligations primarily when they transfer someone to another state. The transferring state usually has custody of and therefore control over the victim. In most other contexts, however, states lack physical control over people abused by third parties in other states. Without such control, a state would have no obligation to protect.
The second approach focuses on the state's control over foreign territory (instead of over the potential victim). This approach dominates the practice 237 but has proven inadequate even in decisions that employ it. In Cyprus, the test of territorial control was overly broad. The court determined that Turkey's human rights obligations applied in northern Cyprus because Turkey exercised territorial control there. 238 If those obligations applied because of Turkey's territorial control, then they presumably applied to all abuses in the relevant territory. Yet the court determined that Turkish responsibility flowed only from the abuses committed by the Turkish Cypriot administration (TRNC), and not from private abuses in the area. 239 The court had difficulty explaining that distinction. Ultimately, it fudged its attribution analysis, justifying its finding by reference to Turkey's close relationship with the TRNC. If that relationship justifies the obligation, then it is unclear why territorial control matters.
The International Court of Justice also applied a test of territorial control in the Armed Activities case. 240 In that case the test proved too narrow. The court determined that Uganda had an obligation to protect in portions of the Congo that Uganda occupied. 241 By focusing exclusively on territorial control, the court failed to consider seriously whether Uganda should have restrained rebel groups in unoccupied Congo. Yet because Uganda seemed intimately connected with abusive groups throughout Congo, the test of territorial control seems myopic. The third approach cures some of those deficiencies by focusing on the state's influence over the abuser. In Ilaşcu, the court determined that Russian responsibility flowed from the abuses committed by Moldovan separatists in Moldova. 242 The court justified that holding by reference to Russia's 'decisive influence' over the separatists. 243 But here again, the court's reasoning is confused. The court is unclear on why Russian influence matters -whether because it justifies a finding on attribution or triggers the obligation to protect. 244 The court is also unclear on what it means by influencewhether that Russia had the capacity to influence the separatists or that Russia should have exercised its influence.
This framework provides some much needed guidance by focusing on the state's relationship with the abuser. Under this framework, territorial control is relevant but not by itself determinative to the question whether a state has the obligation to protect. A state with complete territorial control generally should maintain order in the area and avoid a vacuum in governance authority. 245 The logic is similar to that which applies in the state's own territory. 246 Thus, the Armed Activities court correctly determined that Uganda had to protect people in occupied Congo, because Uganda alone exercised governmental authority there.
The analogy to a state's national territory breaks down when the state shares territorial control with some other entity. In these circumstances, a state may have territorial control but be discouraged from exercising the governance authority necessary to restrain abusers. Turkey maintained a military presence in northern Cyprus, but the TRNC exercised most administrative authority. For Turkey to restrain private abusers in the area, it would have had to expand its own governance authoritya move that would undermine the broader interest in an independent and unified Cyprus. As between Turkey and the TRNC, the TRNC should have exercised administrative control, even though Turkey exercised some territorial control. The Cyprus court decided the case correctly but without justification. 242 Ilaşcu, supra note 123. 243 Ibid., at para. 392. 244 See note 156 and accompanying text. 245 See Cyprus, supra note 76, at para. 78 (justifying Turkish obligations in Cyprus partly on the ground that 'any other finding would result in a regrettable vacuum in the system of human rights protection in the territory in question'); Legal Consequences 247 The French troops were participating in a UN-authorized NATO operation and were not expected to develop complete governance authority in Kosovo. 248 To the contrary, although the NATO force exercised police control, a parallel UN organ (UNMIK) exercised administrative control. The situation is more akin to the one in Cyprus than in Armed Activities. Further, even if France should have addressed the known, imminent threat posed by the ordnance, 249 the question becomes whether France did enough. Specifically, did France act reasonably in entrusting to the UN all demining activities, or should France have taken unilateral measures to address the threat? Here again, the court may have reached the right result but for the wrong reasons. Yet this more nuanced analysis would enable the court to decide the case without implying that abuses committed by IOs never trigger obligations to protect.
Finally, a state without territorial control may have the obligation to protect, just as a state with territorial control may not. Serbia did not control Bosnian territory in the Genocide Case, and Russia did not control Moldovan territory in Ilaşcu. Those states had extraterritorial obligations because of their relationships with the abusive external actors. The states substantially enabled those actors to violate rights. Uganda may have had similar relationships with rebel groups operating in unoccupied Congo. Instead of tethering the obligation to territorial control, the Armed Activities court should have assessed whether those relationships were sufficiently substantial to trigger the obligation throughout the Congo.
B Gender-based Violence
This framework also informs what states must do to protect women from private acts of violence. The obligation to protect has received enormous attention in this context. 250 State has met or failed to meet its obligations in combating violence against women. However, there remains a lack of clarity concerning its scope and content.' 252 This framework reformulates and amplifies on the due diligence standard. Under it, states must take reasonable measures to restrain perpetrators of gender-based violence.
First, a state that knows or should know of an imminent threat must take reasonable measures to avert the harm. 253 In this context, international expectations have not yet coalesced around specific measures that states must take, perhaps because the measures that are appropriate depend heavily on the circumstances (e.g., the seriousness of the threat, the options for averting the harm, and the extent to which the state must respect the suspect's own rights). 254 The state thus has some discretion to select its own measures. 255 But that discretion is bounded. 256 The state's measures must reflect a concerted effort to restrain the abuser and thereby avert the harm.
Consider some concrete cases. In Yildirim v. Austria, the committee established under CEDAW examined whether Austria did enough to protect a woman who was killed by her husband. 257 Austrian officials knew that the husband had threatened and harassed his wife. They responded by issuing restraining orders and filing criminal charges against him. One day, the husband violated his restraining order and fatally stabbed the victim on her way home from work. 258 Austria argued that its measures were reasonable, given the facts: the husband had no criminal history; he had cooperated with police officers investigating the threats; and, as far as Austria knew, he had not previously caused the victim physical harm. 259 The CEDAW committee disagreed. It held Austria responsible for not doing enough -specifically, for not detaining the husband once alerted to his threats. 260 The decision is misguided. On the facts, Austria's measures were well within the bounds of reasonableness.
Goekce v. Austria is a more difficult call. 262 There, the husband had been physically violent for years. Austrian officials repeatedly intervened in the couple's fights and issued restraining orders against the husband. They also considered prosecuting him, but did not for lack of evidence. Yet they knew that their measures were not entirely effective and that the husband had recently purchased a handgun. Further, they appear not to have responded to an emergency call the victim made the evening before she was killed. The record is unclear on why Austria did not respond to the call or what other measures were available but not taken. The treaty body should have considered those questions to appraise whether Austria did enough to avert the harm. Instead, the treaty body held Austria responsible without seriously assessing the reasonableness of the measures taken.
By contrast, in Opuz v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights correctly held Turkey responsible as a bystander. 263 The husband had a history of causing his wife and her mother serious bodily harm. Turkish officials responded lackadaisically. Repeatedly, they either did not pursue criminal charges against the husband or required him to pay only a modest fine for past acts of violence. Moreover, even after the husband killed his mother-in-law and continued to threaten his then ex-wife, Turkish officials released him from prison while his appeal was pending. And for years they appear to have taken no protective measures outside the criminal process. Turkey failed to protect the two women from recurring, imminent harms.
Second, once someone has intentionally caused a woman serious bodily harm, the state must investigate the abuse and pursue criminal measures against the abuser. Here, the state's discretion to identify its measures is more constrained. The practice overwhelmingly directs states to investigate and, if possible, prosecute private actors who intentionally cause serious bodily harm. 264 A state may not adopt more lenient measures or fail to implement its criminal measures simply because the victim is female. 265 Criminal sanctions may specifically deter persons who repeatedly commit acts of gender-based violence, as in Opuz.
266 They also may signal to other potential abusers that the state does not tolerate such violence. 267 See, e.g., da Penha, supra note 218, at para. 56 ('That general and discriminatory judicial ineffectiveness also creates a climate that is conducive to domestic violence, since society sees no evidence of willingness by the State. . .to take effective action to sanction such acts').
Decision-makers should try to specify measures that are better tailored to each state's unique circumstances -considering, for example, the particular kinds of gender-based violence that are especially prevalent in the state (e.g., female genital mutilation, honour killings, or spousal abuse); and the opportunities for and obstacles to effective state intervention. Those factors inform what measures are, in the circumstances of the case, reasonable.
C Other Regimes?
This framework covers obligations to protect under human rights law. Analogous obligations exist in other substantive regimes, where those other regimes define the third-party misconduct that states must suppress. 277 The interests that underlie those regimes differ from the ones that motivate human rights law. But because the obligations themselves are fairly similar, this framework may inform what they require. At the very least, this framework offers fruitful areas for further study.
For example, customary law requires states to exercise due diligence to suppress terrorist acts emanating from their territories. 278 Since the 11 September attacks, the UN Security Council has reinvigorated that obligation. The council has directed all states to protect against transnational terrorism and specified the measures that states must take. 279 This framework may help refine that obligation. 280 First, the framework suggests that the obligation should not necessarily be limited to a state's own territory. 281 Rather, the obligation may depend on each state's relationship with the terrorism entity. A state may have to restrain an entity that it once enabled, even if the entity now operates extraterritorially. Second, the framework offers guidance for defining the obligation. In current practice, decision-makers define best measures that all states are expected to take. 282 This framework recommends tailoring those measures for each state, based on the scope of its terrorism problem and, perhaps, its capacity to respond. 283 Such differentiation may help focus each state on its particular areas of concern and options for redress.
Similar obligations appear in international investment law. Many bilateral investment treaties contain 'full protection and security' provisions that require host states to take reasonable measures to protect foreign investments. 284 Investors increasingly invoke those provisions, but international lawyers disagree on precisely what they require. 285 For example, lawyers disagree on which harms trigger the obligation: only harms to physical property 286 or also other kinds of harm. 287 This framework suggests that the proper inquiry is not whether the conduct caused physical damage, but whether the damage -physical or not -is serious. Under that approach, third-party conduct that is especially harmful to an investment may trigger the obligation, even if it causes no physical damage and even if other, less disruptive conduct does not.
Finally, the law of armed conflict requires parties to a conflict to take measures to suppress wartime abuses. Parties to a conflict must 'repress grave breaches, and take measures necessary to suppress all other breaches'. 288 This framework recommends applying that obligation even when the party lacks agency-like control over the abuser. But the framework recommends applying a higher standard of care in agency relationships than in third-party ones. A party to a conflict would be directly responsible only for the grave breaches committed by its members (i.e., agents). It would have to take measures to restrain both its members and associated third parties. Those recommendations address a current gap in the doctrine of superior responsibility. Under that doctrine, a superior officer may be criminally responsible if he does not restrain a subordinate from committing war crimes. 289 The doctrine applies only if the officer has effective control over the subordinate. 290 It requires nothing of someone who has substantial influence short of control. Requiring agency-like control may make sense for a doctrine of individual criminal responsibility. But international law may assign broader obligations to parties to a conflict than to individual participants. Under this proposal, a party would have to restrain third-party groups with which it associates. The doctrine of superior responsibility need not (but might) also be adjusted to render individual participants criminally responsible, when they fail to restrain abusers over whom they exercise influence short of control.
Conclusion
The above framework disciplines the practice on the obligation to protect in light of the dominant trends. Readers may contest one or another facet of the framework, and they may offer alternatives. That dialogue is encouraged, for in addition to persuading readers of the merits of this framework, the article has a more modest objective: to begin conceptualizing the obligation in general terms. The same basic principles animate obligations to protect, regardless of context. Those principles and the benchmarks for applying them do not dictate specific outcomes for every obligationto-protect scenario. But they do provide a framework for decision. In the messy circumstances of any particular case, they focus decision-makers on the considerations relevant to assessing state bystander responsibility.
